Post by John Golden
In the forthcoming article Reconceptualizing Copyright’s Merger Doctrine, Pamela Samuelson of Berkeley Law provides an extended review of copyright law’s merger doctrine. Courts have periodically invoked this doctrine in restricting the extent to which copyright protections apply to the expression of an idea when, as Samuelson puts it, “that idea is incapable of being expressed, as a practical matter, in more than one or a small number of ways.” Samuelson’s article seeks to quash a number of “myths” about the doctrine, touching on aspects of its substantive scope, the frequency of the doctrine’s applicability, and its history as a creature of “common law adjudication.” Samuelson concludes, among other things, that (1) the doctrine serves as an important “limiting principle of U.S. copyright law”; (2) the doctrine can affect copyrightability as well as copyright scope; and (3) courts should avoid an overly narrow view of the doctrine, thereby helping it realize its potential as a means for “mediating conflicts between and among the interests of first and second-generation authors, of third parties affected by those disputes, and of the public.”
This blog post focuses on another aspect of Samuelson’s article, its discussion of how the merger doctrine relates to other limiting doctrines in copyright. These other doctrines include the following: (1) the scènes à faire doctrine, which limits the extent to which copyright covers standard or indispensable elements of expression (such as conventional poses in portraits, see William W. Fisher III et al., Reflections on the Hope Poster Case, 25 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 243, 259 (2012)); (2) copyright law’s originality requirement; (3) exclusions of facts, ideas, and other functional subject matter from copyright protection. At one point, Samuelson suggests that courts’ relative lack of confidence in their mastery of copyright law’s content or justifications might explain some of the apparent proliferation of doctrinal overlaps. She writes, “Courts sometimes perceive the other doctrines as overlapping with merger, but in some cases, courts invoke multiple doctrines when seemingly unsure which doctrine would provide the soundest grounding for the court’s decision.”