Property

Is a Covenant-Not-To-Sue A License? — Christopher Newman

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Post by Christopher Newman, George Mason University.

Thanks to Jorge for his thought-provoking post.  It’s a thrill to have smart people find your work worth picking up and using for something.  Here are a few responsive thoughts of my own.

Because the term “license” encompasses a variety of interests comprising differing sets of jural relations, I think it’s important to specify what exactly is at stake in any given context when we ask “does a CNS amount to a license”?   As Jorge notes, the actual posture of Meso makes it a bad vehicle for this (nevertheless important and interesting) question, because the argument there really has nothing to do with identifying the substantive content of the property interest (if any) that accrues to the obligee of a CNS.   Meso is trying to obtain standing to enforce use restrictions that are purely contractual; bizarrely, they are in the position of arguing the equivalence of contract and property not to draw implications that sound in property, but simply to make a round trip back into contract.

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When is a Covenant just a Covenant? Of Meso, Newman and Transactions with Patents – Jorge Contreras

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Post by guest blogger Jorge Contreras, University of Utah College of Law.

A petition for certiorari was recently filed with the Supreme Court in Meso Scale Diagnostics LLC v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH (Del. 2015). In it, Petitioner poses the following question: “Whether a covenant, promise, or agreement not to sue for the infringement of a federal patent is a license of that patent as a matter of federal law.”

Though phrased simply, the question is an important one for reasons that extend well beyond the immediate dispute between the parties (which itself is too complex to describe here). Among other things, its answer has serious implications for the doctrine of patent exhaustion and the treatment of industry-wide commitments to limit the enforceability of patents in contexts such as standard-setting (commitments I have elsewhere termed “patent pledges”).

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New Contributions to the Law of Property by Henry Smith: Realism, Numerus Clausus, and Custom– Yonathan Arbel

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Post by Yonathan Arbel

Professor Henry Smith has recently published two new engaging and interesting papers in the area of property law, both part of different symposia. For the symposia lists of papers, see here and here, and for the papers, see here and here (citations at the bottom of the post).

The first is part of a symposium where the main question was the enduring appeal of doctrinal analysis in private law, despite the “we-are-all-realists-now” dominant point of view. There are many great contributions there, and Smith takes this question to the area of property. He makes a simple but strong argument: the most basic of property doctrinal categories (or modules)—property as a law of things, the centrality of possessory rights, and property law as a partly formal system—stands tall in the face of the realist onslaught because, far from being transcendental nonsense, they serve important social functions, namely, they serve as information heuristics for complex social situations.  Smith surveys changes to property law since the times of the realists and shows that wherever changes occur, they were around the edges of property, and that the basic categories were left largely untouched despite the impression one might get from reading purely academic works.

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Private Law in the Digital Age – Dan Kelly

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Post by Dan Kelly

Private law aficionados enjoy teaching, and discussing, many of the classic common law cases, Hawkins v. McGee (in contracts), Pierson v. Post (in property), and Vosburg v. Putney (in torts).  But, of course, private law is still relevant for, and able to provide insights into, new legal issues emerging in the twenty-first century.  One of these issues is fiduciary access to digital assets.

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Private Law Consortium, Day 1

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Post by Janet Freilich

 

On July 6-7, McGill University’s Faculty of Law and Center for Intellectual Property Policy hosted the Third Annual Private Law Consortium, organized by David Lametti. Participants at the Consortium came from Bar-Ilan University, Harvard University, McGill University, the University of Oslo, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of Trento. The Consortium spanned a wide variety of private law topics, including property, torts, contracts, and intellectual property.

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ISNIE 2015 — Dan Kelly

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Post by Dan Kelly

The International Society for New Institutional Economics (ISNIE), soon to be renamed The Society for Institutional and Organizational Economics (SIOE), is hosting its 19th Annual Conference this weekend, June 18-20, at Harvard Law School.  The conference website includes details on this year’s program and papers.

The conference is sponsored by Harvard Law School through the Project on the Foundations of Private Law.  In addition to keynotes by Martin Nowak (Harvard) on “The Evolution of Cooperation” and Michael Whinston (MIT) on “Property Rights and the Efficiency of Bargaining,” the program includes a number of panels that intersect with private law topics, including agency and fiduciary law, contracts, intellectual property, and property rights.     

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“Taking Turns”: Common Solution, Unusual Remedy — Dan Kelly

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Post by Dan Kelly

To facilitate coordination and mitigate conflicts, a common solution in everyday life is the idea of taking turns.  If two siblings or children are fighting over a toy (say, a ball or doll), a parent or teacher may suggest taking turns.  If drivers are exiting a crowded parking lot after work, church, or a ballgame, the implicit norm is to take turns.  Yet, this strategy of taking turns has received relatively little attention in law and the social sciences.

In “Taking Turns” (forthcoming Florida State University Law Review), Ronen Perry (Haifa) and Tal Z. Zarsky (Haifa) examine turn taking from both a fairness and efficiency perspective.  Their lead example is from a trusts and estates case, In re McDowell, 345 N.Y.S. 2d 828 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. 1973):

Two siblings jointly inherit their late father’s rocking chair. The chair has principally sentimental and no real economic value; it cannot be physically divided between them, and selling it to distribute the proceeds will compensate neither for the sentimental loss. What, then, should become of the disputed property? In a self-confessed “strange” decision in the McDowell case, the Surrogate’s Court of New York ordered that the two siblings take possession of the chair alternately for six-month periods; and that when one passed away, the other would obtain exclusive possession.

Are there other examples of turn taking in law and legal institutions, particularly private law?  Given the prevalence of turn taking as an informal solution to coordination problems, why does the formal law not embrace taking turns more frequently when it comes to remedies? 

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The Bundle of Sticks: Is There Anything It Can’t Do? — Henry E. Smith

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Post by Henry E. Smith

Last week, the Supreme Court decided Henderson v. United States.  Justice Kagan’s opinion for a unanimous court holds that a court can use its equitable powers to order the government to transfer a convicted felon’s firearms to a third party as long as the court is satisfied that the recipient will not give the felon control over the guns.  (Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), it is unlawful for a felon to possess a firearm.)  As reflected in the 9-0 result and the skepticism of the Justices about the government’s arguments for why a flat-out refusal to allow the felon any choice of transferee, the opinion might be regarded as an unremarkable bit of criminal law or statutory construction.

But then there’s this:

Section 922(g) proscribes possession alone, but covers possession in every form. By its terms, §922(g) does not prohibit a felon from owning firearms. Rather, it interferes with a single incident of ownership—one of the proverbial sticks in the bundle of property rights—by preventing the felon from knowingly possessing his (or another person’s) guns. But that stick is a thick one, encompassing what the criminal law recognizes as “actual” and “constructive” possession alike.

Slip Op. at 3-4 (citations omitted).  After gesturing to the bundle of sticks, Justice Kagan goes on to note that the right to sell or otherwise dispose of an item is a distinct incident of ownership and concludes that one can exercise the right to alienate without either actual or constructive possession.

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Law and the Big Oops — Henry E. Smith

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Post by Henry Smith

vossMost of the time when we think building encroachments, we’re talking about an inch here or there. But what happens when someone builds an expensive house on the wrong lot? That could never happen, could it?

Oh yes, it can and it does. In one recent example, Mark and Brenda Voss mistakenly had their vacation home (pictured above) built at a construction value of $680,000 on the lot next to the one they actually own. Mr. Voss owns a real estate company (!), but the mistake and the ultimately responsibility appear to be the builder’s. Bargaining is inevitably going to be tough in what amounts to the ultimate bilateral monopoly situation. (Merrill and I have a case in our casebook in which the frustrated mistaken improver demolishes the house – and winds up having to pay for it!)

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